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ABSTRACT 
Yilmaz and Musto (2003) theorized that with access to equity markets and theoretical election-
contingent securities, voters could financially hedge against the outcome of an election so that 
social values and ideology were the only factors determining their vote. Mattozzi (2008) found 
that creating a portfolio of such election-contingent securities was realistic. This paper examines 
if this may be happening in practice by creating an index of economic and social variables within 
congressional districts compared to the district’s vote for Trump in the election. Looking at 
wealthier districts where voters are more likely to have investments, I find that only variables 
relating to the social values of a district are significant relative to economic variables, in line with 
the theory. Poorer districts vote based upon both economic and social factors. The analysis yields 
a similar result with Mitt Romney as the nominee, showing that the effect is not limited to Trump.  
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I. Introduction1 
 The rise of right-wing populism across the Western world has resulted in election 
outcomes that went against expert predictions. In the United States, this was best observed in the 
2016 Presidential election with the unexpected ascendance of Donald J. Trump to the presidency. 
This trend begs the question of why these figures have become popular. To this point, in the 
1992 United States Presidential election, Bill Clinton’s campaign manager James Carville 
famously proclaimed how their campaign would win the election: “It’s the economy, stupid!” 
While some may theorize that it was Trump’s populist economic message that resonated with the 
voters in states that gave him an Electoral College majority, scholars have suggested in the past 
that that may not be the case.  
In 2003, Bilge Yilmaz and David Musto put forward a theory that in a frictionless 
market, voters could make investments to completely hedge against political uncertainty risk in 
elections.2 The economic impact of a candidate’s redistributive policy would not impact the 
results of the election because the redistribution would happen in pre-election trading reflecting 
probabilities of a particular candidate winning. Put simply, the election becomes solely based on 
ideology, not economics. As Yilmaz and Musto used a hypothetical, perfectly election-correlated 
security in their theory, the question was raised as to whether it would be possible to hedge 
uncertainty risk with real stock market securities. Mattozi (2008) looked at Yilmaz and Musto’s 
                                                          
1 I thank Dr. Robert Inman for the generous time and guidance he has given me in his capacity as my faculty 
advisor. I have been fortunate to learn from him as his advisee, student, and research assistant. I also thank Dr. Utsav 
Schurmans for his work in organizing the Wharton Research Scholars program. Furthermore, I thank my family and 
friends for their support throughout my time at Penn. In particular, I am grateful for my friend Jedidiah Dale’s 
instruction in ESRI ArcMap that I used to create the maps in the appendix. Any errors are mine alone. 
2 A frictionless market assumes that all voters have access to trading with no transaction costs, changes in aggregate 
wealth, and perfectly election-contingent securities. In reality, this is not possible, but for the purposes of this study 
the overarching conclusions of Yilmaz and Musto are being tested, not their assumptions per se. 
theory and found that in the United States, it is possible to hedge against political uncertainty and 
it could be done in a relatively straightforward manner.  
The remaining question is if this hedging actually happens. One would expect that 
wealthier individuals with access to markets would be able to trade whereas poorer voters would 
not—therefore under the theory, the wealthy vote based on ideology while the poor vote based 
on economics. Unfortunately, tracking individual voters’ investments is not possible; however 
examining voters in the aggregate based on Congressional district characteristics can act as a 
proxy to see the factors that lead voters to choose a particular candidate.  
In this study, I find that for wealthy districts, only economic variables had a statistically 
significant impact on the percentage of people who voted for Donald Trump. In less wealthy 
areas, both economic and social variables were significant. To determine the social values of a 
district, I found the percent of people in each district that were Evangelical Christians as a proxy 
for social conservatism. This data was originally county-level data that was overlaid on 
congressional districts. Furthermore, I used Census Bureau data to find the percentage of women 
who were not in the labor force to determine social values as more conservative areas should 
tend to have women at home rather than working. For economic factors, I used Census Bureau 
data on the breakdown of industries like mining and manufacturing as well as unemployment 
data to determine the economic profile of each area.3  
According to the theory, people with access to financial markets can trade away the 
redistribution (political) risk of the election so that only their social values determine their vote. 
Without access to trading, the vote should be based on economic and social values. My results do 
                                                          
3 Please refer to the appendix for maps of districts based on the relevant factors and scatterplots for each regressed 
variable. 
not conclusively prove that this theory happens in reality, but it yields results one would expect if 
the theory did hold true. It is still possible that these results are a coincidence and wealthy people 
are able to withstand post-election redistribution rather than hedging ex ante. For robustness, 
Mitt Romney’s 2012 district-level showing had similar results in terms of the study, showing the 
phenomenon was not limited to Trump. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 Can and do people really trade away the risk from a candidate’s policy during an election 
campaign? Bilge Yilmaz and David Musto theorize that investors can make trades that will 
mitigate potentially negative consequences of a candidate’s economic policies. The implication 
of their theory is that “ideological” and not “pocketbook” issues drive the result of an election, 
assuming that a candidate’s economic policies will redistribute, not increase or decrease, the 
aggregate wealth.4 John Roemer advocates for a similar theory in that he argues that in elections, 
tax policies lose salience and will approach 0% as social issues become more prominent in the 
election.5 Therefore, redistributionist tax policies would not mean as much in an election as 
social policies.  
Part of the redistributionist’s policies being ineffective is the assumption that measures 
can be taken by an individual to mitigate a reduction in their wealth. Mattozzi found that an 
investor can quite simply trade securities on the market to hedge against political uncertainty, 
                                                          
4 Musto, David K., and Bilge Yılmaz. "Trading and voting." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 5 (2003): 990-
1003. 
5 Roemer, John E. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb." Journal of Public 
Economics 70, no. 3 (1998): 399-424. 
using the United States’ 2000 Presidential election as his sample case.6 Knight also found that 
election-contingent security markets do seem to exist, using data from 2000 to show that policy 
platforms were capitalized into equity prices. Importantly, Knight found that in 2000, the policies 
were capitalized before the actual election (and implementation of the policies) in proportion to 
Bush/Gore’s Iowa Electronic Market probabilities.7 This was a key part of the theory put forward 
by Yilmaz and Musto. 
Knight’s findings are not the only opinion held among scholars. Beyer et al. found that 
political considerations do not affect stock prices with any statistical significance. Those 
researchers determined that monetary policy decisions from the Federal Reserve have a much 
more significant impact. Election outcomes “are a minor distraction.”8 Any gains from changes 
in administrations are inconsistent when examined across election cycles, but expansive 
monetary policy always has a positive correlation with an increase in equity prices. Jens 
presented an alternate view in that political uncertainty in gubernatorial elections affected 
investment by and in companies located in states where the election was occurring. Therefore, it 
appears as though even at a non-Presidential level, elections can affect investment, dissenting 
from the Beyer team’s findings.9 Perhaps even indirectly an election can change equity prices as 
it can cause a firm to make different investments depending on if a state’s redistribution policies 
may change.  
                                                          
6 Mattozzi, Andrea. "Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the US stock market." Public 
Choice 137, no. 1-2 (2008): 43-55. 
7 Knight, Brian. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 
presidential election." Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 4 (2006): 751-773. 
8 Beyer, Scott B., Gerald R. Jensen, and Robert R. Johnson. "Don't worry about the election." The Journal of 
Portfolio Management 30, no. 4 (2004): 101-109. 
9 Jens, Candace E. "Political uncertainty and investment: Causal evidence from US gubernatorial elections." Journal 
of Financial Economics 124, no. 3 (2017): 563-579. 
How individuals and investors receive their news is also worth examining, as they can 
only act upon policy announcements if they know they were made. Ge et al. looked at then-
candidate Donald Trump’s tweets from the 2016 Presidential election and found that when 
tweets mentioned a specific company in a negative way, there was a statistically significant 
decrease in the company’s share price controlling for negative events outside of the tweet.10 This 
shows that in real time, investors make decisions based on news related to candidates’ policies.  
 Yilmaz and Musto’s paper suggesting that redistributionist policies should not affect a 
candidate’s likelihood of winning has been partially tested over the past 15 years.11 Scholars 
have validated the idea that it is possible, and relatively simple to make trades to hedge against a 
certain candidate’s redistributive policy, a central tenet of the theory.12 The year most analysis of 
the theory has been performed was in 2000, but there is still work to be done on subsequent 
elections, particularly 2016 which seems to be the most intriguing with its unexpected result. 
Therefore, the Yilmaz-Musto theory can be further tested by looking to see if it holds for the 
election of 2016 in terms of seeing if economic factors had a role in shaping the outcome of the 
election. 
III. Yilmaz-Musto Theory 
In this section, I briefly summarize the theory that led Yilmaz and Musto to their 
conclusion that, with some assumptions, voters with access to trading should solely vote based 
on ideology.  
                                                          
10 Ge, Qi, Alexander Kurov, and Marketa Halova Wolfe. "Stock Market Reactions to Presidential Social Media 
Usage: Evidence from Company-Specific Tweets." (2017). 
11 Yilmaz and Musto, “Trading and Voting.” 
12 Mattozzi, “Can we insure against political uncertainty?” 
 Consumers will vote based on the utility, uc they get from their wealth under a 
candidate’s tax policy, ωc, and the candidate’s ideology, I. 
 
If a consumer starts with wealth w0 and purchases xc contracts that pay if L wins at price 
p*, he receives xc if L wins and 0 if R wins. The above shows that if R wins, he receives his 
initial wealth, ω0 minus the amount spent buying L-victory-contingent contracts xcp*.  But if L 
does win, he gets: 
 τ*ω = his share of the redistribution of aggregate wealth, plus 
 (1- τ), the after tax value, multiplied by 
 (1-p*)xc, his profit from the purchase of the contract, plus 
 ω0, his initial wealth, plus 
δc, his share of any gain in aggregate wealth, which is assumed to be 0 with pure 
redistribution 
 
Πc = the probability that L wins 
So the consumer wants to maximize this expression based on the original utility function
 
Where ωc is equal to the value above based on his share of aggregate wealth and after tax 
gains from purchasing the contract in addition to gains to the aggregate economy δc and his 
initial wealth. He will also maximize xc based on ideology vc(L). The second part of the 
expression is the utility if R wins which is 1 minus the probability of L winning times his utility 
from R winning plus his utility from R’s ideology. 
The first order condition of this expression can be written as: 
 
Note that Πc is the same for everyone—the probability of L winning is the same no 
matter who you are since everyone has the same information on the outcome probability 
(through Iowa Electronic Market data). That means that the right side of the above equation is 
the same for everyone in the market. This value must equal 1 because if it was greater or less 
than 1, then it would be better to buy one candidate over the other, and we assume that aggregate 
wealth is the same in both states.13  
 
                                                          
13 The validity of this assumption is debatable as voters may interpret candidate statements to mean one will increase 
the overall “pie” of the economy more than the opponent. Still, it is unlikely that a candidate will claim to not want 
to boost the economy as much as the opponent, so this paper assumes δTRUMP = δCLINTON. 
Going back to the original utility function, since utility from wealth, uc(ωc1), is the same 
across outcomes, a voter only prefers L winning if vc(L) gives the voter more utility than vc(R)— 
they only vote based on preferences in ideology. 
IV. Significance of the Study/Audience 
This paper is important for the scholarly community in finance departments engaged in 
the topic of uncertainty risk as it will see if empirically, and if the congressional district-level 
proxy is accepted, voters hedge against redistribution risk. Furthermore, from a political 
economy perspective this paper should prove useful because it will see if certain voters weigh 
ideology more than economics when choosing a candidate. Beyond the academic realm, 
politicians and campaign managers should take interest in the latter point because that means that 
appeals to voters based on promises to redistribute wealth (without creating new wealth) may not 
improve their chances of winning due to the ability to trade election-contingent securities. 
Investors should also be interested in this study as it would be interesting to see if investors tend 
to re-allocate their portfolio based on each candidate’s likelihood of winning. That means that 
investors can make a profit (or at least avoid losses) by taking uncertainty risk into account. 
Finally, from a behavioral finance standpoint, this will be a worthwhile examination of how 
investors behave given their voting preferences for a particular candidate.  
 
V. Data Sources 
 US Census Bureau County Business Patterns (CBP): The 2016 CBP data can be broken 
down into Congressional districts to see estimates for what share of jobs belong to a certain 
industry like mining/oil extraction, healthcare, and education. This data will paint a picture of the 
economic situation for the people in each district. This determines if economic or social issues 
ideology determines who we would expect the area to vote for in the district. The Census Bureau 
also has data on wages, education, and demographics that will be used to determine economic 
factors in my regression.  
 Religion and Congressional district: This dataset used in Setzler’s 2016 paper contains 
information about religious beliefs in Congressional districts. This data will go into determining 
the ideology of a district. 
 2016 and 2012 Presidential Election Returns: I use Congressional district-level election 
results to see the percentage of people within each district who voted for Donald Trump and Mitt 
Romney in 2016 and 2012 respectively. 
VI. Methodology 
Using the aforementioned data, this study compiled a list of all the Congressional districts 
in the United States and sees: 
i. Industry Mix 
a. The industry mix for a district will show the percentage of people employed in 
the Agriculture/Mining Sector and the Manufacturing Sector. During the 
campaign, candidate Trump made many pronouncements promising economic 
help for these areas where jobs have been lost due to foreign competition and 
regulation.  
ii. Unemployment Levels 
a. The level of unemployment within the district which shows the economic 
health for the area. 
iii. Healthcare 
a. The amount of people receiving public health insurance (Medicare or 
“Obamacare”) combined with the uninsured. 
iv. Gender Roles 
a. Knowing the number of women outside of the labor force can be used as a 
proxy for social conservatism as more conservative areas would be expected 
to have traditional gender roles with women staying in the home while the 
men work. 
v. Religious Prevalence 
a. Using Setzler’s data, the percentage of people within each district identifying 
as Evangelical Christians can be determined as a proxy for conservative social 
views. 
These factors will let me get a sense of the economic and ideological identity of each 
district. 
I run multiple OLS regressions using different sets of variables. The first regression is for 
the entire sample of districts (n = 435) to see if economics alone is statistically significant. The 
regression is in the form of: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑀𝑃 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝜀0 
The next regression tests if the significance of these variables change when social factors 
(representing gender roles and religion) are added to the full-sample mix: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑀𝑃 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 +  𝜀0 
I will then repeat the previous two regressions for wealthy and less-wealthy districts. This 
is because in order to trade away risk from a candidate’s redistribution policies, voters need 
access to financial markets. Logically, a wealthier district would have more people with active 
investments in the stock market. To categorize these districts, a cutoff of 10% of the district 
earning a household income of over $200,000 is used. This cutoff separates the sample into the 
top 93 wealthiest (top 21.4%) and bottom 339 (bottom 77.93%) districts so that the wealthy 
districts form roughly the top quintile. Two districts that had exactly 10% of households with an 
income over $200,000 according to the Census Bureau data were omitted to avoid arbitrarily 
classifying them as wealthy or not wealthy areas.  
Three regressions test for the robustness of this study. The first regresses the percentage 
of voters choosing Trump relative to those who voted for Mitt Romney in 2012. This looks to see 
if Trump had any particular sway, likely due to his more populist policies, relative to Mitt 
Romney’s more orthodox conservative positions. The OLS regression follows the simple form: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 %𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑀𝑃 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑦 +  𝜀0 
where if the Romney coefficient is insignificant or not close to 1 the result would show that 
Trump had a different impact as a candidate than Romney did. 
 More directly, the regressions for only economic factors and then for both economic and 
social factors are repeated using the 2012 Romney results to see if these variables changed based 
on Trump’s populist policies.  The two regressions are: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑌 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝜀0 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑌 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 +   𝜀0 
Broadly, the percent of the vote trump receives is a function of a district’s economics and social 
ideology. For Yilmaz and Musto’s theory to possibly be occurring in real life, for the wealthier 
districts, only the ideology part of the function should be statistically significant.  
% 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠) 
TABLE 1: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VARIABLES BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 
Economic Factors Social Factors 
Unemployment Rate Gender Roles within the home 
Mining and Agriculture Jobs Evangelical Christians 
Manufacturing Jobs  
Percent with Public Health Insurance  
 
VII. Results 
TABLE 2: AGGREGATED FACTORS DETERMINING VOTER PREFERENCE 
 Full Sample 
(n=435) 
% Wealthy <10 (n=339) % Wealthy > 10 (n=94) Full 
Sample 
(n=435) 
% Wealthy 
<10 
(n=339) 
% Wealthy 
>10 (n=94) 
Average Trump 
Vote = 45.863  
(SD = 16.792) 
Trump 
Vote 
(1) 
Trump 
Vote 
(2) 
Trump 
Vote 
(3) 
Trump 
Vote 
(4) 
Trump 
Vote 
(5) 
Trump 
Vote 
(6) 
Trump 
Vote 
(7) 
Romney 
Vote 
 (1) 
Romney 
Vote 
(2) 
Constant 41.246** 
(3.759) 
-17.603** 
(4.653) 
58.721** 
(5.173) 
-4.061 
(4.800) 
47.797** 
(9.950) 
-3.740 
(15.082) 
-1.889** 
(.769) 
8.315* 
(4.572) 
7.799 
(14.433) 
Unemployment -3.274** 
(.451) 
-2.876** 
(.353) 
-3.096** 
(.465) 
-2.552** 
(.319) 
-2.470* 
(1.465) 
-2.335 
(1.448) 
- -2.494** 
(.304) 
-2.686* 
(1.386) 
Agriculture 2.098** 
(.266) 
1.430** 
(.210) 
1.910** 
(.268) 
1.279** 
(.186) 
3.204** 
(1.133) 
1.604 
(1.135) 
- 1.231** 
(.177) 
.106 
 (.349) 
Manufacturing 1.172** 
(.139) 
.785** 
(.110) 
.966** 
(.156) 
.523** 
(.108) 
.547 
(.379) 
.087  
(.365) 
- .254** 
(.103) 
.106  
(.349) 
Obamacare .284** 
(.110) 
-.570** 
(.099) 
-.027 
(.127) 
-1.067** 
(.102) 
-.061 
(.363) 
-.402 
(.345) 
- -1.115** 
(.097) 
-.412 
(.330) 
Women at home  - 229.660** 
(14.464) 
- 258.771** 
(13.851) 
- 168.100** 
(40.600) 
- 241.424** 
(13.194) 
152.838** 
(38.855) 
Evangelical - .241** 
(.047) 
- .195** 
(.044) 
- .300* 
(.167) 
- .219** 
(.042) 
.416** 
(.159) 
Romney - - - - - - 1.018** 
(.016) 
-  
R2 (Adj) .3664 .6197 .4009 .7220 .1805 .3091 .9080 .7242 .3907 
* indicates significance at α = .10 
** indicates significance at α= .05 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the coefficients for each dependent variable. 
Districts where the percentage of people with incomes greater than $200,000 is exactly equal to 
10% are omitted from the limited samples but included in the full sample. 
 
VIII. Discussion 
 These results show that for the full sample, all factors are significant in both regression 1 
and regression 2 with just economic factors and then both economic and social factors. This 
shows that the Yilmaz-Musto effect is not evident across the entire population. In order to see 
any Yilmaz-Musto effect, the statistical significance for the wealthy and non-wealthy districts 
needs to be tested.  
 For less wealthy areas, all variables (economic and social values) are statistically 
significant, showing that voters in these areas appear to vote based upon their economic 
conditions and social values. They do not seem to hedge against redistribution risk as the 
economic variables are statistically significant. According to Yilmaz and Musto’s theory, this is 
either because they do not have access to financial markets or because they believe that 
aggregate gains to the economy will be different between the two candidates, and one 
candidate’s policies will give them greater wealth after the election.  
 For wealthier areas, the only statistically significant variables in the full regression are the 
social variables, though the percentage of Evangelical Christians in the district is only significant 
at a 90% confidence interval. Economic factors do not have statistical significance in the Trump 
regression. This is the result one would expect to see if Yilmaz and Musto’s theory happens in 
actuality. If these wealthy voters have access to financial markets and hedge against 
redistribution risk, the economic variables in the area should be statistically insignificant in who 
they tend to vote for—only their social values should dictate their preference. However, just 
because the result is promising for the theory does not mean that it proves it. This result merely 
shows evidence that this might be what causes these variables to be insignificant. 
 There are other reasons besides hedging against redistribution risk through trading 
election-contingent securities that may explain these results. One such reason could be that the 
economic conditions in wealthier areas are so great that these individuals are secure enough to 
withstand the results of the election no matter how much redistribution results. These people 
would not worry about their finances and merely vote because they care about social issues 
more.  
 Another interesting result from this regression is the robustness check comparing 
Trump’s 2016 performance to Mitt Romney’s performance in 2012. First, we see that the 
coefficient on the Romney term relative to Trump in 2016 is 1.018, which shows that Trump 
tended to increase the Republican vote percentage over Romney, but put up generally similar 
results. Approximately 91% of the variation in Trump’s vote percentage across districts can be 
explained from Romney’s result. This alone shows that Trump’s populism did not have a 
tremendous effect on changing the portfolio of Republican voters.14 Furthermore, applying the 
Yilmaz-Musto framework to Romney’s result yields similar results as when applied to Trump. 
The less wealthy areas vote based on both economics and social values whereas the wealthy 
districts only had significant social variables. To be fair, under Romney, unemployment was also 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for wealthy areas, but the other economic 
variables were insignificant, similar to Trump. 
 The similarities between the results for Trump and Romney show that if Yilmaz and 
Musto’s theory actually occurred, Trump’s populism did not appear to make an impact. It seems 
that the reasons people voted for a candidate within each district was rather constant between 
populist Trump and the more typically conservative Romney. This either means that in both 
cases, the wealthy voters were able to hedge against redistribution risk effectively, or that voters 
did not believe that the gains from redistribution under Trump would be different than Romney.  
 Finally, outside the scope of the test of Yilmaz and Musto’s theory, the regression shows 
the effect each variable had on Trump’s vote percentage within each district. The tables below 
                                                          
14 A more compelling picture of this effect is found in Appendix Figure 9, where Trump and Romney’s results 
appear highly correlated in a scatterplot. The outlier areas in the far right part of the graph are districts in Utah where 
Trump performed significantly worse than Romney. 
show the correlations between each variable upon each other and Trump’s vote percentage for 
the full sample, less wealthy areas, and wealthy areas. 
TABLE 3: CORRELATIONS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
 Trump Unemploym
ent 
Manufacturi
ng 
Agriculture Obamacare Gender 
Roles 
Evangelicals 
Trump  1.0000       
Unemploym
ent 
-.3622 1.0000      
Manufacturi
ng 
.3657 -.1535 1.0000     
Agriculture .3651 -.0166 -.0139 1.0000    
Obamacare -.1072 .7154 -.1300 .2470 1.0000   
Gender 
Roles 
.3908 .4162 .0486 .2950 .6482 1.0000  
Evangelicals .3126 -.0421 .1489 .1745 .1252 .1668 1.0000 
 
TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS FOR THE LESS WEALTHY DISTRICTS (RICH<10%) 
 Trump Unemployment Manufacturing Agriculture Obamacare Gender 
Roles 
Evangelicals 
Trump  1.0000       
Unemployment -.5078 1.0000      
Manufacturing .3540 -.2537 1.0000     
Agriculture .3284 -.0934 -.0826 1.0000    
Obamacare -.3188 .6822 -.2931 .1502 1.0000   
Gender Roles .3332 .3446 -.0589 .2319 .6101 1.0000  
Evangelicals .2682 -.0781 .1061 .1064 .0383 .1306 1.0000 
 
 
TABLE 5: CORRELATIONS FOR THE WEALTHIER DISTRICTS (RICH>10%) 
 Trump Unemployment Manufacturing Agriculture Obamacare Gender 
Roles 
Evangelicals 
Trump  1.0000       
Unemployment -.3161 1.0000      
Manufacturing .2109 -.0795 1.0000     
Agriculture .3477 -.1490 .1259 1.0000    
Obamacare -.1891 .6940 -.2731 .1512 1.0000   
Gender Roles .3130 .3078 .1822 .2523 .3398 1.0000  
Evangelicals .3336 -.3900 .1565 .4340 .1046 -.0782 1.0000 
 
As these correlations show, Trump’s vote percentage was positively correlated across the 
full sample with the percentage of jobs in manufacturing, the percentage of jobs in agriculture 
and mining, areas where women tend to stay at home rather than work, and areas with a high 
proportion of Evangelical Christians. Trump’s vote percentage was inversely correlated across 
all samples with the unemployment rate and the amount of people with public health insurance 
or no insurance. Given Trump’s platform, these correlations are as expected. 
TABLE 6: FACTORS RELATIONSHIP WITH TRUMP VOTE FOR FULL SAMPLE 
Factor Relationship 
Romney Positive 
Unemployment Negative 
Manufacturing Positive 
Agriculture and Mining Positive 
Obamacare Negative 
Traditional Gender Roles Positive 
Evangelical Positive 
 
IX. Conclusions 
These results do not conclusively prove that Yilmaz and Musto’s theory happens in real 
life, but they do show the signs one would expect to see if it did. While their theory offers only 
one explanation for why only the social variables were statistically significant in wealthier areas, 
given Mattozzi’s study into the feasibility of the theory, this shows that it could be an 
explanation for what goes on during election cycles. Other explanations cannot be ruled out 
through this study. 
Although using Congressional districts as a proxy for individual voters’ portfolios and 
values is useful, the most direct way to see if Yilmaz and Musto’s theory occurs is looking at 
individual voters’ trades given each candidate’s likelihood of victory. This may be done in a 
future study if a large sample of individual trades is compiled in conjunction with the 
demographics behind each investor.  
 Looking ahead within the United States’ 2018 House of Representatives elections, these 
results are interesting as they show that wealthy areas vote based on social issues. This suggests 
that wealthy districts will judge President Trump’s job performance (and the Republican-
controlled Congress) based on their social policies, not economic ones. A study of the results 
from the Congressional races after this year’s elections would be interesting to see if the results 
from 2012 and 2016 were replicated. 
 
X. APPENDICES 
FIGURE 1: DISTRICTS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME RELATIVE TO BENCHMARK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: DISTRICTS BY PERCENT IN AGRICULTURE/MINING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: DISTRICTS BY PERCENT OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: DISTRICTS BY PERCENT WITH NO PRIVATE INSURANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: DISTRICTS BY PERCENT IN MANUFACTURING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: DISTRICTS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: DISTRICTS BY PERCENT OF WOMEN OUT OF LABOR FORCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND EVANGELICALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND ROMNEY VOTE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND WOMEN IN LABOR FORCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 11: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND PERCENT IN MINING/AGR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND PERCENT IN 
MANUFACTURING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND PERCENT WEALTHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 14: SCATTERPLOT OF TRUMP VOTE AND PERCENT WITHOUT 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15: DISTRICT BY 2016 WINNER 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 16: DISTRICT BY 2012 WINNER 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Beyer, Scott B., Gerald R. Jensen, and Robert R. Johnson. "Don't worry about the election." The 
Journal of Portfolio Management 30, no. 4 (2004): 101-109. 
Ejara, Demissew Diro, Raja Nag, and Kamal P. Upadhyaya. "Opinion polls and the stock 
market: evidence from the 2008 US presidential election." Applied Financial Economics 
22, no. 6 (2012): 437-443. 
Ge, Qi, Alexander Kurov, and Marketa Halova Wolfe. "Stock Market Reactions to Presidential 
Social Media Usage: Evidence from Company-Specific Tweets." (2017). 
Jens, Candace E. "Political uncertainty and investment: Causal evidence from US gubernatorial 
elections." Journal of Financial Economics 124, no. 3 (2017): 563-579. 
Knight, Brian. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the 
Bush/Gore 2000 presidential election." Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 4 (2006): 
751-773. 
Mattozzi, Andrea. "Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the US stock 
market." Public Choice 137, no. 1-2 (2008): 43-55. 
Musto, David K., and Bilge Yılmaz. "Trading and voting." Journal of Political Economy 111, 
no. 5 (2003): 990-1003. 
Roemer, John E. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb." 
Journal of Public Economics 70, no. 3 (1998): 399-424. 
Setzler, Mark. "Religious Differences among Congressional districts and the Success of Women 
Candidates." Politics & Gender 12, no. 3 (2016): 518-548. 
 
